This paper analyses the impacts of three different indirect tax policies on the Brazilian economy: reduction of indirect taxes over the main household consumption products; reduction of indirect taxes over the main inputs used in agriculture; and the reduction of indirect taxes over all products in a specific region (São Paulo state) in Brazil.
Introduction
Tributary reform is a recurring subject of discussion in Brazil. In the last twelve years the debate on this theme has increased due to the frequent diagnostics pointing to the inefficiency of the Brazilian tax system, especially its indirect tax system. Since then society has recognized the need for broad fiscal reform, even though there is no general agreement on how to do this reform. As a consequence, many different proposals were sent to the congress since the 1990s 1 .Among them is the Proposal of Constitutional Amendment 175/95, whose objectives where to simplify the national tax system, increase its degree of equity, reduce tax evasion and increase economic efficiency, but which didn't succeed. In In previous empirical studies the potential regional effects of changes in the tax system and other distributive effects have seldom been considered. In this respect it is evident that there was a lack of formal instruments for analyzing the effects of tax reform.
Objective
The objective of this research is to identify the potential impacts of changes in the Brazilian indirect tax system. This is done through the simulation of three different indirect tax policy scenarios, and analyzing their effects over the long run configuration of the Brazilian economy, focusing especially on the income distribution, welfare, and poverty impacts of these changes. Regional effects within Brazil are also emphasized. The simulated scenarios are: 1) reduction of indirect taxes on the consumption of the main products used by the households; 2) reduction of indirect taxes on the main inputs used by agriculture; and 3) reduction of indirect taxes over all products and services in the São Paulo state. The reference year for the analysis is 2001.
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The Brazilian Tax System: Main Characteristics
It has been argued that the tax system in Brazil is complex, expensive, economically inefficient, and socially unfair. Many reasons justify this argument. First, it is composed of many different tax "species": taxes, contributions for specific improvements, social contributions, economic contributions, and compulsory lending. Second, the three government levels, namely the Federal, State and City, have the power to impose taxes.
These initial two factors taken together are responsible for about 80 different types of taxes.
Third, there exist a large number of tax rates for some taxes, thus increasing the complexity of the system: this is true for example for the case of ICMS (Tax on Flow of Goods and Services) and IPI (Tax on Industrialized Products). Presently, the ICMS has just four tax rates: one inside each state, two between states, and another for the external sector.
However, through agreements made at the level of the CONFAZ (the Council for Tax Management) it is possible to reduce the rates through several different ways.
There are two main factors associated with taxation that are generally regarded as responsible for economic inefficiency in Brazil. The first is the high number of tax rates of ICMS and IPI, which distorts the efficient use of resources by giving incentives to sectors benefited with smaller rates. The second relates to the cumulative incidence of some taxes, as used to be the case for COFINS (a contribution for the Social Security System) and still is the case for ISS (Tax on Services). The cumulative taxation distorts the price system markedly, since products with more intermediate steps in the production process would pay a higher tax rate, forcing (in some cases) vertical integration in the market.
Another deficiency in the Brazilian tax system is that it facilitates the tributary competition among states, resulting in a so-called "fiscal war". This consists of a game of actions and reactions between the state governments (and also between city governments) with the aim of attracting new investments, or keeping previous investment locally. It is a situation of conflict in the Federation, with some players imposing losses on others. The cooperative federalist relationship is broken, leading to tensions in the political sphere.
According to Varsano (1997) , from the state government's point of view there are clear economic and political incentives for perpetuating the fiscal war. However, the same author points out that it threatens the federation, worsens public finance, compromises future tax income collection, and causes deviations in relative prices. Studies that have analyzed the fiscal war in Brazil (VARSANO, 1997; DINIZ, 2000; DULCI, 2002 ; among others) have predominantly concluded that the winners in the short-and medium-term are the more powerful states, which are able to support the fiscal exemptions and tax revenues losses. At this point it is worth noting that there are no studies about the fiscal war in Brazil that have addressed its effects upon income distribution and welfare.
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The main positive effect associated to the Brazilian tax system, from a governance point of view, is its ability to collect taxes. Data from the Brazilian National Accounting System for 2001 show that the total tax burden -CTB -in Brazil amounted to a 33.4 percent share GDP in that year. From this total, 68.06 percent was appropriated for the federal government, 27.48 percent for the states, and 4.46 percent for the municipal governments.
The 
Poverty in Brazil: All Overview of the Base Year Situation
This section provides a brief description of poverty and income inequality in Brazil in 2001, with some general aggregated information cited in Table 1 .
The row entries in Table 1 4 The equivalent household concept measures the subsistence needs of a household by attributing weights to its members: 1 to the head, 0.75 to the other adults, and 0.5 to the children (e.g. to feed 2 persons does not cost double). Because poverty is defined here on an equivalent basis, a few (very large) families in middle income groups fall below the poverty line. PrPop = % in total population; PrInc = % in country total income; AveHouInc = average household income; UnempRate = unemployment rate; PrWhite = % of white population in total; AveWage = average normalized wage; PrChild = share of population under 15 by income class. Source: PNAD, 2001.
The unemployment rate is also relatively higher among the poorer classes, a very important point that should be noted due to its relevance for modeling. The opportunity to get a new job is probably the most important factor that will lift people out of poverty: hence the importance for poverty modeling of allowing the model to capture the existence of a switching regime (from unemployment to employment), and not just capture changes in wages. As can be seen in Table 1 Barros et al. (2001) , working with a poverty line that takes into account nutritional needs, find that 34 percent of Brazilian households were poor in 1999. 7 The proportion of households below the poverty line in the other income groups are 0.284 percent for the 4 th , 0.14 percent for the 5 th , 0.04 percent for the 6 th , 0.008 percent for the 7 th , and 0.001 percent for the 8 th . There are no households below the poverty line for the two highest income classes. Note that the poverty calculations are performed on an adult equivalent basis. This explains why not all the households in the first income class are poor: they refer to households with a small number of members, specifically one or two persons only. FGT0: the proportion of poor households below the poverty line; FGT1: the average poverty gap; FGT2: extent of inequality among the poor. Table 2 shows a large average poverty gap for the two lowest income classes.
Together these two income classes contribute about half of the Brazilian economy's general average poverty gap index. The first income class, for example, falls below the poverty line by about 70 percent. Thus, large income increases for the poor are needed to significantly change the number in poverty.
As stated before, this general poverty and inequality picture also has an important regional dimension in Brazil since economic activity is located mainly in the South-East region. This is particularly true for manufacturing: agriculture is more dispersed among regions. Table 3 shows more information about the regional variation of poverty and income inequality. The map in figure 1 shows where regions are located, and shades them according to proportions of households in poverty. Proportion below poverty line
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As can be seen in Table 3 , the states in the North (N) region account for 8 percent of total national population, compared to 23.5 percent for the North-East (NE), 45 percent in the South-East (SE), 16 percent for South (S), and 7.2 percent for the Center-West (CW). In the SE region the state of São Paulo alone accounts for 22.9 percent of the total population in Brazil.
The fourth column in Table 3 Finally, Table 4 shows the distribution of occupation wage (OCC) classes among the household income classes (POF classes). 
Methodology
This research is conducted with the aid of a static inter-regional (bottom-up) general The model production technology is composed of a hierarchical system in different levels, which represent the many optimization stages in the firm's productive processes.
Production is modeled through a multi-production system, where each industry can produce many products. In the present version, however, only agriculture produces more than one product. Firms decide how much to produce of each good in the first (top) level of the production tree, through a CET (Constant Elasticity of Transformation). In the second level, intermediate composite products are combined with primary factors composites through a Leontief production function. In the third level, the composite inputs are produced combining imported and domestic products through another CES function, while the composite primary factor is assembled from capital, land and labor, also from a CES function. Finally, in the last nest of the production tree composite labor is defined as a CES combination of 10 different labor skills.
In the demand side, the AGE model (TERM-BR) has one representative household by each region, with a particular consumption bundle, whose behavior is modeled through the Linear Expenditure System. Exports of each region inside Brazil face an export demand schedule, with constant elasticity. Investment demands are endogenous, and government expenses are exogenous.
Note that even though the main model uses representative households in the regions, all the poverty and income distribution analysis is performed in the micro-simulation module, as explained below.
The main sources of information for the household micro-simulation model (see Ferreira-Filho and Horridge, 2004) In doing so, the approach used here relocates jobs according to changes in labor demand. This is done by changing the PNAD weights of each worker to mimic the change in employment. This procedure is called the "quantum weights method". Via this approach, then, there is a true job relocation process going on. If some region has insufficient unemployed workers in some occupational category (and such occasionally occurs), the already employed workers will increase the number of hours worked to meet the increasing labor demand. Once the final results are obtained, the change in poverty indexes are calculated and reported. A new updated income matrix is generated for the total number of records in the original database (PNAD). This post-simulation matrix has the same number of records as the original one (263,938), and keeps unchanged the original link between workers and households.
One final point about the above procedure should be stressed. Although the changes in the labor market are simulated for each adult in the labor force, the changes in expenditures and in poverty are tracked back to the household dimension. This is possible since PNAD has a key that links persons to household; that is to say, it is possible to know which household each person belongs to. Each household contains one or more adults, either working in a particular sector and occupation, or unemployed. In the model then it is possible to recompose changes in the household income from the changes in individual wages. This is a very important aspect of the model, since it is likely that changes in employment records are cushioned, in general, by this procedure. For example, if one person in some household loses his job but another in the same household gets a new job, household income may change little, or not at all. Moreover, since households are the expenditure units in the model, we would expect household spending to be cushioned by this income-pooling effect.
More details about the logical structures of the TERM-BR model, as well as of the micro-simulation model and the aggregation used are described in the Technical Appendix to this report.
13
Indirect Taxation in the Term-BR
The TERM-BR model treats indirect taxes into two different groups: taxes over products (involving especially the Tax over Flow of Products and Services -ICMS; Tax over Industrialized Products -IPI; Tax over Services -ISS; and the Tax over Financial
Operations -IOF, among others), and taxes over production (COFINS, PIS/PASEP, Contribution of Educational Wages, Contribution to the S System, etc). The simulations in this research refer to taxes in the first group, indirect taxes over products. The TERM-BR treats these taxes as ad valorem taxes over basic flows.
Considering that the tax base size (the value of the transaction flows) varies endogenously in the model, the simulations allow for the capture of the total effects of an indirect tax change, namely the first order effects associated with the change in the tax rate, and the second order effects associated with the change on the tax base in response to the tax rate change. Hence, the impact over government income due to a change in the tax rate over products can be represented in the following equation:
VTAX is the value of tax receipts over products, VBAS is the value of the tax base and t is the tax rate. The above equations estimate the impacts over tax collection and also update the many tax matrices in the database.
The Database Structure
In this study, the model's database distinguishes 27 regions inside Brazil, 42 activities, and 52 products (one sector, Agriculture, produces 11 products, while all the others produce a single product). There are two product sources, domestic and imported, and two types of margins, namely trade and transport margins. Labor is classified into 10 occupations, according to wage classes, as a proxy for skills. Households are classified (in the micro-simulation model) into 10 different income groups, with particular consumption bundles. The database preparation for the core CGE model was accomplished according to the following steps: • After this, the regional IO database was created, using information from various other sources.
• Then, a trade matrix was estimated, using a gravity model.
The database preparation steps for the micro-simulation model will be described in another section.
The Model's Closure
The main features of the closure used in all simulations are stated as follows:
• Capital stocks in each industry are endogenously determined, flowing between industries and regions driven by a fixed rate of return. Industries that perform better thus attract capital (experience a capital inflow), in order to keep the rate of return constant.
• The level of investment by sector is endogenous, and follows the capital stock in each activity. The total investment, then, is endogenous, and determined by the profitability in each industry and each region. Note that it is possible to have a negative change in investment in specific industries and regions.
• The labor force is free to move between sectors and regions, driven by regional real wages changes: a real wage differential is needed to induce labor movements between regions. The total employment is fixed nationally.
• Government consumption is kept fixed both at national and regional levels. This means that the change in tax revenue caused by the policy shocks is reflected in changes in the regional government deficits. A "budget neutral" policy is achieved through an endogenous adjustment in the income tax rate, so that the nationwide total tax collection is kept constant. A direct (income) tax transfer mechanism is then put into action to compensate the states for the loss in indirect tax collection, with the national (unique) income tax rate endogenously adjusted to ensure fiscal neutrality. With this closure some states (the richest states especially, where the bulk of the income tax is collected in the base year) will provide net income transfers to others, which would happen through the central government. This closure, however, was not used in the last simulation, to be discussed below.
• The household real consumption is endogenous, both at national and regional levels.
• The Balance of Trade/GDP ratio is exogenous. Household real consumption is the endogenous terms of absorption, adjusting to satisfy the balance of trade constraint. This feature is consistent with the view that eventual trade deficits cannot be indefinitely funded by foreigners.
• All the technical change variables are exogenous.
• Finally, the model's numeraire is the consumer price index.
An important point should be noticed regarding the proposed closure. As explained before, the model is written in linearized form, which means that most of the variables represent percent changes in relation to the base scenario. This is the case of aggregate employment. To fix aggregate employment nationally, then, does not mean to fix the level of employment. It just means that the policy being implemented does not change aggregate employment from its long run path, an idea compatible with the natural rate of unemployment theory.
This is an important point, and deserves some more elaboration. The model contains no theory to determine the long run rate of unemployment, say N. Therefore, it is implicitly held fixed. To illustrate, consider a simulation where, in the control scenario of a model with variables in levels, the total labor force grows exogenously by 1000. Employment will grow by 1000*(1-N). The policy scenario will not alter this, which causes the percent variation for this variable between the control scenario and the policy scenario to be zero. Hence, for a long-run comparative static scenario (comparing policy with control at a future date), we hold the percentage change in total employment fixed, although jobs are relocated across sectors and regions. N could be thought of as the "natural rate" of unemployment. However, it might equally be determined by social mechanisms outside the model. This, then, is what is meant by the simulations performed in this report.
The closure used thus has a long run flavor in the sense that capital is allowed to accumulate endogenously and employment follows its long run path, even though the model is a comparative static model. The full set of equations and variables, as well as the endogenous/exogenous choice can be seen in the Technical Appendix to this report.
The Simulations
Three simulations were accomplished in this study. The first simulation (Experiment 1) implemented a 50 percent reduction in indirect tax rates of the main household consumption products. The second one (Experiment 2) halved the indirect tax rates over the main inputs used in Agriculture, while the third simulation (Experiment 3) implemented a 10 percent reduction in indirect taxes of all products and services in one specific region, the São Paulo state. This scenario could be understood as the first step in a fiscal war initiated by São Paulo.
In the first two simulations the neutrality of the fiscal budget is obtained through the income tax transfer mechanism mentioned previously, in which the regional government deficits are compensated by income tax transfers. In the last simulation, however, this type of closure would not be appropriate, since it is a "fiscal war" scenario. In this case the state government deficit is allowed to vary endogenously. Finally, for the third simulation the 10 percent reduction in the indirect taxes was applied to all products and services in São Paulo state, across all users, implying a shock matrix of 2,392 values (52 products x 46 users) for domestic products and an equivalent value for imported products.
Results
In this chapter the main findings of the research are presented. (Table 23) shows some selected macroeconomic results for all the three experiments at the same time, to facilitate analysis.
Experiment 1: reduction in indirect tax on food
Reductions on indirect taxes on food are generally regarded as policies that benefit the poor 13 . The argument is that these policies -under the hypothesis that producers significantly pass through the benefits to consumers -reduce food prices, which largely benefits the poor, whose food shares in the consumption bundle tend to be higher than the rich. Other effects of this kind of policy, especially over the regional economies, are less explored in the literature. Table 5 shows the results of Experiment 1 for some aggregated variables and the six regions inside Brazil. As can be seen in Table 5 , the introduction of the policy causes a small reduction in GDP (0.023%). This result is linked to the behavior of the GDP components that are reduced as a consequence of the policy. The reduction in household consumption (aggregated), an apparently unexpected result, is a result of the direct and indirect effects of the policy over the many different products, as well as of the weighting criteria adopted to aggregate regional results to the national, and of the hypothesis used in closing the model. First of all, it is important to notice that the consumption of households with the targeted products actually increases in every region, and also at national level. But model results show a reduction in consumption of other products that were not directly affected by the tax reduction, which is caused by a cost-driven price increase
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. It should be remembered that the tax rate reduction does not contribute to reduce industry costs.
Note that the consumption function used in the model does not include savings as an "extra" commodity. This means that the total value of consumption is not equal to total income. If Y is total income, C is total household consumption and S household total savings, we have:
In this case, C can fall even if Y increases, depending on the value of S required for the macroeconomic balances. In this experiment there is a 1.7 percent increase in nominal investment, which requires the fall in consumption.
The exchange rate variation is associated with the household consumption behavior and the hypothesis used for the external sector closure, namely the fixity of the balance of trade as a share of GDP. The reduction in food prices and its consequent increase in demand cause a deviation of domestic production towards domestic use, and against exports. These products, however, are important exported products in Brazil, and the increase in its domestic absorption tends to induce a deficit in the trade balance, which is fixed as a share of GDP. To correct this deficit the exports of other products must therefore increase and this is done through a 1. North-East) of Brazil. The regional GDP growth in these regions is due mainly to each region's production structure, which is relatively more dependent on the products which showed increase in demand. The other regions, mainly São Paulo and the Rest of SouthEast are those which show a greater decrease in regional GDP and household consumption.
The relatively greater fall in consumption in these regions is due to the concentration of the regions' relatively richer households, which have a greater share of imported products in their consumption bundle. These households are specially harmed by the exchange rate devaluation, through the increase in the price of imported products (the impact on the specific price indexes will be analyzed later).
The results in Table 5 for the aggregated regions point to employment growth in the regions where GDP growth is observed, despite the increase in the real wage in every region. The increase in the level of activity in these regions increases the demand for labor and other primary factors, thus increasing the real wage of labor and attracting labor from the contracting regions.
The national consumer price index (CPI) is the model's numeraire. The regional CPI, however, also shows a distinct behavior across states, showing a decrease in the poorest regions (i.e. North, North-East and South), and increasing in the relatively richer regions.
Again, this result is due to the particular composition of the consumption bundle in these regions, with the richer regions being more intensive in imported commodities. These results display an interesting clue for the distributional effects of the policy. The behavior of prices for households for the five products directly affected by the policy is reflected in Table 7 below, shown by region. As can be seen from the table, there was a price decrease for those products for households in every region. It should be noted, however, that the prices of the other goods and services experienced a rise in every region. The values in Table 9 are percentage changes in real income, defined as the percent variation in each household nominal income minus the respective Consumer Price Index variation. As can be seen from the table, real income increases relatively more for the poorest households as a consequence of the policy shock implemented, which is in turn caused by each particular consumption bundle composition and household's income composition. The prices of the richer household's consumption bundles (not shown here) actually rise, another interesting result of this experiment. This happens because the products targeted by the policy have a small share in those household's bundle.
Another important dimension to note in Table 9 is the regional difference in results.
The poorest states of the North and North-East regions tend to show a higher increase in real incomes, and the poorer the household, the higher the increase. Again, this is a result strongly linked to consumption composition, and highlights the poverty alleviation potential of the indirect tax policy. The poorest households in the poorest states would be the main beneficiaries of this kind of policy.
A last point to be stressed in this experiment is the tax collection impact, both at regional and national levels. These results can be seen in Table 10 below. As can be seen from Table 10 , there would be a non-trivial reduction in tax revenue in every state, as expected. The tax revenue fall, however, is bigger (in relative terms) in the poorest states of North and North-East, due to the larger share of the targeted products in these regions' gross product. This is a very important point to be noted from a policy perspective. This kind of policy would have to be followed by some type of compensation for the federation's poorest states, to avoid strong resistance from the regional governments.
Indeed, this issue is always present in the discussions of fiscal reform in Brazil, when different states would be unevenly affected by different policy choices. States like Maranhão and Piaui are among the poorest states in Brazil, and would certainly resist a policy change that would cause a strong fall in tax collection in their regions, unless some compensation policy was implemented.
The last column in Table 10 shows the money amount received or transferred by each state in order to keep the total tax collection unchanged. Note that the total income transfer is not equal to the fall in indirect taxes in each state. This happens because the unique national income tax rate is required to rise by about 7 percent in order to raise income taxes to compensate for the national fall in indirect taxes. This implies an increase in the income tax collection in every state, which partly offsets the fall in indirect taxes revenues. In some states, however, this increase in income tax is not enough and an incoming transfer would be needed in order to keep the balance unchanged, and vice-versa.
As can be seen from the Brazil, 2004) . In spite of the criticism about the efficiency of these transfer policies and their political motivation, the results presented here show that they would be far less expensive than a general indirect tax reduction on food, when seen from a public governance perspective. These calculations, however, do not as yet take into account the administrative costs of these transfer policies, which are reputed to be substantial.
Finally, it is worth noting that the indirect tax reduction on food would have to be borne by each regional government, since the state governments already get the bulk of the indirect taxes. On the other hand, the transfer policy under way is backed by the federal government. The federal government would also be responsible for raising the income tax rate in the country, a very sensitive issue in Brazil.
Experiment 2: reduction in indirect taxes on the main agricultural inputs
As mentioned before, the second experiment consists of a 50 percent reduction in the indirect tax rate on commodities used as the main agricultural inputs. These commodities are: Other Chemical Products, Other Agricultural Products, Refined Petroleum Products, and
Other Food Products (where feed is aggregated). This kind of policy is aimed at reducing agricultural costs, and consequently the costs of food products. Table 11 shows some aggregated results from this simulation. Similarly to what was seen in Experiment 1, real exchange rate devaluation is observed in this experiment for the very same reasons. The reduction in indirect taxes on inputs reduces food prices, thus increasing domestic consumption of domestic commodities.
These commodities are important export commodities, and the domestic absorption increase would drive the trade balance into a deficit, which must be corrected by the currency devaluation. Aggregate employment increases in Agriculture and in the sectors more closely linked to agricultural activity, namely: the Sugar Industry (0.73%), the Coffee Industry (0.65%), the Meat Industry (0.6%), and the Vegetable Oils Industry (0.34%). The average real wage also increases.
In terms of regional growth, it can be seen that real GDP increases in most regions except São Paulo and the Rest of South-East, the richest regions in Brazil. Agriculture and the food industry, which are the expanding activities, represent a small share of total value of production in these regions, the most important manufacturing regions in Brazil. These states, however, use the bulk of imported inputs, whose prices increase due to the exchange rate devaluation. Thus, many important manufacturing industries contract in the state, a contraction not compensated by the expansion of agriculture, which causes the fall in regional GDP.
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The behavior of employment and regional real wages is associated with the regional The simulated policy would also cause a fall in the Consumer Price Index of the poorest regions in Brazil (N and NE), as observed in Experiment 1. Nominal incomes also increase in every region, generating a net impact on real incomes that is shown in Table 14 . Some points should be noted in this experiment in comparison with the previous one.
First, the CPI index falls less (and nominal incomes also increase less) in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 as a general observation. The reason is that intermediate inputs are only part of the cost of agriculture. The reduction in taxes on intermediates, then, reduces costs less than what had happened in Experiment 1. Moreover, the difference in the CPI decrease between the poorest and the richest regions is less accentuated, even though the price fall is also greater for the poorest households. However, the result in terms of real income still tends to benefit more the poorer regions.
The implications for government tax revenue of this kind of policy can be seen in Table 15 below. As can be seen from Table 15 , the results again differ considerably across regions. Finally, it should be noted that tax revenue loss is much smaller in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, or about one third of that value. This would require a smaller increase in the direct tax transfers. In this case the direct tax rate increases by 2.2 percent, and Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are again the states transferring the most of the direct tax amount.. It is interesting to note, however, that in proportional terms the fall in the transfers from Rio de Janeiro is smaller than the fall in transfers observed for Sao Paulo. The states contribute to the income tax increase in proportion to their income, but the fall in indirect tax collection depends on the production composition in each state, which generates the difference.
Experiment 3: reduction in indirect taxes in São Paulo state
In analyzing Experiment 3 results, it should be taken into account that the closure used here is different from the two previous experiments. This experiment implements a region-specific policy which requires a bottom-up inter-regional model, like the one used in this study. In this simulation the indirect tax rate on every commodity and service in São Paulo state is reduced by 10 percent. This simulation is an attempt to extract lessons from the potential effects of a method frequently used by the Brazilian states to attract investments, namely the reduction in indirect taxes
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. Besides the spatial effects of such a policy under a static perspective, its impacts on welfare are also analyzed. In this case however, the income tax transfer mechanism is not assumed, since it is a fiscal war scenario. The state government deficit is allowed to vary endogenously, and admittedly be financed by mechanisms outside the model over the long run configuration of the state economy, the other state's economies, and of the national economy are harder to address, and this difficulty will be initially investigated here. Table 16 shows the results for some aggregate variables. As can be seen from Table 16 , the shock causes a 0.27 percent increase in the national GDP. This result is due mainly to the increase in household consumption and investment, as a consequence of the policy. The aggregated impacts are, of course, strongly influenced by the impacts in São Paulo, where the change originates.
The regional results show that São Paulo is the main beneficiary of the policy, at the expense of the other regions, it being the unique state to show an increase in regional real GDP (1.4%) after the shock. This GDP increase is due to an increase of 2.26 percent in real household consumption in the state, and about 1.9 percent in real investment. The increase in household consumption is explained by the generalized fall in prices of goods and services in the state, reaching more than 80 percent of the 52 products specified in the model. The largest price reduction was observed in Shoes Products (-3.5%). The increase in investment happens because in the model, investment is driven by profits.
With this increase in domestic absorption, the currency must devaluate by 0.34 percent in the model to sustain the hypothesis about the fixity of the trade balance as a share of GDP. As a result of this devaluation the export volume index of São Paulo increases by almost 2.5 percent while the import volume in the state also increases by 1.7 percent; conversely for the other states, both their exports and imports decrease.
Employment increases in São Paulo and decreases in the other regions, while the real wage increases in all regions. The attraction of jobs to São Paulo state reduces the economic activity in the other states (due to the low primary factor elasticity of substitution), thus reducing their exports.
Nationally, the sectors that show greater increase in activity are the Automobile Industry (1.43%), Electronic Equipment (1.3%), Other Vehicles and Spare Parts (1%), NonFerrous Metallurgy (0.87%), and Electric Material (0.83%). There is a generalized fall in the economic activity for the other states. Table 17 shows the twelve sectors that present the greater percent variation in activity in response to the shock. The CPI is reduced in São Paulo, but increases in every other region in Brazil,
suggesting that the households in the poorest states would be harmed by the policy. Table   18 shows the impact of the policy on real income, by income group and by region. especially for the richest, and this phenomenon has the potential to worsen income distribution (this point will be further discussed later).
Finally, the impacts of this experiment over tax revenue can be seen in Table 19, below. From the table, it can be seen that São Paulo is solely responsible for almost all the negative variation in tax revenue. The results of this simulation show that, in general, a region-specific tax policy like the one simulated here tends to benefit almost exclusively the region where the reduction is implemented, in terms of expansion in activity level and employment effects. For the other states the policy is shown to have negative impacts, reducing employment and activity,
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although real incomes tend to increase in all regions. Besides the federative conflicts that emerge from this uneven result on employment across regions -an aspect broadly discussed in the most recent literature about tax policy reform in Brazil (Varsano, 1997; Diniz, 2000; Dulci, 2002) -such a policy has a potential to be regressive in terms of inequality reductions, since it tends to increase income in the richest region more. The effect on employment is probably one of the reasons why virtually all states in Brazil got pushed into this "fiscal war". Again however, the costs in terms of tax revenue losses are substantial, allowing only the most powerful states to be the main actors in this "war".
POVERTY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION RESULTS
In this section the micro-simulation model results are used to further extend the poverty and income distribution analysis. Some aggregated results are presented in Table   20 below. In the table, FGT refers to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke index (Foster et al, 1984) . According to Table 20 , the best result in terms of overall poverty reduction appears in Experiment 1 (reduction in indirect taxes on food), which would cause a 0.91 percent fall in the headcount ratio (measured in terms of persons). Experiments 2 and 3 would give similar results in aggregate but with important regional differences, and this will be further explained later in this report 24 .
The average poverty gap would also decrease more in Experiment 1. As seen before, this index has a high value for the poorest household income classes in Brazil (which is in part related to the small results observed on poverty in the simulated scenarios). It indicates an improvement in income of the poorest social sectors, even though this improvement is not enough to generate a massive movement across the poverty line.
The GINI index would improve (fall) in the fist two experiments, and would worsen in Experiment 3, the fiscal war scenario. The changes are very small, as is usually the case with this index
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. Note that the FGT index, which is sensitive to both changes in the extent of poverty and income distribution, does not change at all in Experiment 3. This is a result of the compensating effect on this indicator of the reduction in the headcount ratio and the 24 Note that the result is due uniquely to the allocative effects of the policy, since the model's poverty line is not indexed by the particular household class consumer price index. This is a point to be further explored in future developments of the model. 25 Ferreira et al (2006) show that the GINI index fell by 6.62 percent between 1990 and 2004 in Brazil. increase in inequality. If one takes into account that the bulk of poverty reduction in this scenario happens in São Paulo state, the value of the FGT index in Experiment 3 leads to the conclusion that even though some poor people were driven out of poverty in the state due to the policy shock, the opposite effect on the other states actually worsened the income distribution in the country, an illustrative effect of the fiscal war.
Note, however, that this result is linked to the choice of the state to lead the fiscal war, namely São Paulo, the richest state in Brazil. The base year poverty gap in this state is one of the smallest in the country. The fall in the poverty gap due to Experiment 3 (not reported here) is also higher in the state, and increases in other important states like Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Santa Catarina e Rio, and Grande do Sul 26 . Table 21 shows the percentage change in the number of persons bellow the poverty line (percentage change in the headcount ratio, or HR), by regions inside Brazil, and also the aggregate result for the entire country (last line). The change in poverty can also be analyzed by household income class, as is shown in Table 22 . The numbers in Table 22 are respective percentage changes in the number of poor households and the total number of households leaving poverty, by household income class.
The large numbers observed in the higher income classes represent large percentage changes over a very small base, since very few households in those income classes are poor. Experiment 1, besides generating results more evenly distributed in regional terms, also generates the largest fall in poverty (as evaluated by the HR, 573,591 persons in 135,552 households). It is interesting to note, however, that the fiscal war scenario shows the largest fall in the number of the poor households in the lowest income class, with 35,158 households leaving poverty. This happens because São Paulo state is the most populous state in Brazil. Even though relative poverty there is not very high, the absolute number of poor persons is the largest in Brazil, an aspect of the poverty problem not always taken into account in country.
Conclusions
The policies analyzed in this paper have different potential for distributive effects. The first experiment, the reduction in indirect taxes on food, seems to be the most promising in terms of poverty alleviation, since it generated the largest real income increase in the country. Due to the importance of the food sector in the Brazilian economy, this is also the policy that generates the larger positive effect on economic activity, with the best results on poverty and inequality indicators.
The cost of this kind of policy, however, sheds doubts about its feasibility. The policy seems to be too expensive in terms of tax revenue loss, when compared to the actual direct transfer policies underway in Brazil. This cost seems too much, even if one considers that the administrative costs of the transfer policies are not yet even included in the calculations (or all the inefficiencies that usually arise, as a matter of fact). Another important point to be noted here is that it would be hard to get a general agreement among states to implement these policies, since the tax revenue loss is unevenly spread across them. The poorer states would lose proportionally more than the richer states which, in the case of a compensatory policy regime through income taxes, would have to be net contributors to the poorer states.
The second kind of policy analyzed, the reduction in intermediate inputs used in Agriculture, does not generate any remarkable result regarding welfare improvement for the poor, but is much less expensive than the previous policy. The results are, however, more evenly spread around the country, which generates the largest fall in the GINI index when compared to the other experiments. This kind of policy is therefore found to be more income inequality reducing than the first policy, which would be more poverty reducing. The differences, however, are very small to support further conclusions, and more research would be recommended on this issue.
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The third policy, on the other hand, brings to light some of the crucial aspects of the "fiscal war" in Brazil, and points to a new important consequence: the potentially negative effect of the policy in terms of income distribution. Almost by definition, the richest states are the ones more able to engage in a strong "fiscal war". If these states are at the same time those areas where poverty is less accentuated (as is usually the case), the fiscal competition will worsen income distribution in the country as a whole. This phenomenon, of course, still has regional dimensions that must be taken into account, as illustrated by the trade push effect that can arise in particular regions. This effect has not been discussed so far in the Brazilian economic literature, which has instead emphasized growth effects.
Another point to be noted regarding the above discussion is that the reaction of other states to the fiscal war would likely slow down the deterioration in income distribution.. Once one state has started the process however, there is an incentive for the other states to follow this behavior. Obviously, the effect upon employment is the most visible part of the problem, and probably the one targeted by the politicians. But model results suggest that this also involves a seemingly unnoticed income distribution dimension.
The results presented here thus suggest that the attempts to withdraw from the Brazilian states the right to decide about their indirect tax policies (or, at least, to reduce it) seems to be in line with the federalist way of doing economic policy, in terms of poverty reduction. The end of the "fiscal war" would, according to our results, be poverty-friendly in Brazil.
Finally, the cost of general tax reducing policies and the way the burden is distributed among the regional governments is found to be a very important political issue, since indirect taxes accrue to the state governments, who would have to bear the brunt of reduced tax collection. The tendency of the Brazilian federal government to fund direct transfer policies instead of trying to promote indirect tax reductions seems to be a way of overcoming these political difficulties, directly targeting the poorest. --0,419 -0,540 0,878 -0,586 -0,646 -0,417 
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